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Abstract
This note acknowledges the current policy concerns of emerging market economies (EMEs)
relating to their foreign capital influxes. Although, capital mobility brings many benefits to a
country's economy, it also creates instability and worsens crises. Managing this issue is not an
easy task. Some measures should be put in place to curb the sudden capital influxes that are
being experienced by some EMEs around the globe. This note suggests possible policy options
for managing the capital inflows.
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Introduction
The management of the capital inflows along with exchange rate and at the same time to have
counter-cyclical monetary policy is thought to be the impossible mission often called the
impossible trinity or trilemma (Eun & Resnick 2009, Aizenman 2010, Agrawal 2010, Verma
2010). Prevailing theories of international economics and finance suggest that a country can
achieve only two of the three objectives: price stability, floating exchange rate and capital
mobility. In other words, no country can have flexible exchange rates and at the same time
implement sound monetary policy to maintain low to moderate inflation, and reduce exchange
rate volatility preferably within the range of undervalued exchange rates to benefit its exports.
Accordingly, at any particular time, it can choose only a combination of two options out of the
available three choices: capital mobility, exchange rate management, and price stability/curbing
asset bubble.
Schools of Thought
The debate on capital flows is not new (Gavin et.al 1997, Rana 1998, Mundell 1999). It gets
priority when we are facing global recession and/or financial crises (El-Erian 2010, Horrocks
2010, Oxford Analytica - OA 2010, International Monetary Fund - IMF 2011, Institute of
International Finance - IIF 2011). This time, the most alarming issues have been the liquidity
problems/credit crunch and now the capital influx to some developing nations around the globe.
In this context, to handle the issue of capital inflows, there are at least three schools of thought:

Traditional school: who believe that capital inflows are very important for the
growth and development of an EME. There should not be any restrictions and capital
should be allowed to flow freely across the border.

Sceptics/Critics school: this school is sceptical over the role of capital inflows and
they believe that free capital flows lead to crises in the absence of proper economic
framework and policy response to curb it.

Fresh/New school: who intend to find a fresh solution through evaluating and
rethinking about the role of capital inflows to specific nations. This school often thinks
that capital inflows neither come at the right time nor in exact quantity when required.
Thus, the task here is to assess and improve the absorbing capacity and quality of
investments using such capital.
Policy Options
On the issue of capital inflows, the policy response of a country usually depends on the school of
thought to which its policymakers adhere. If the nation admires the traditional school, there is no
policy action required on the issue of managing capital inflows; and the policy makers should do
nothing but address other issues like exchange rate and price stability. If the nation believes in
the second and/or third school, some actions are to be taken at an appropriate time to manage the
influx of unanticipated capital inflows.
However, it is evident that capital inflows in some EMEs have continued to rise in recent
times; which, if not managed properly, could become a threat to both economic and financial
wellbeing of those nations. Accordingly, this note focuses on ten possible options of managing
foreign capital flows for nations facing a surge in capital inflows. Those policy options are:
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1.

Sterilisation: Sterilisation is most commonly used as a first line of defence if there is
no exchange rate target other than preventing excessive volatility. If there is excessive
volatility and disruptions to the macroeconomic situation, central banks can intervene to
prevent appreciation of local currency by buying foreign currency and supplying local
currency in the market. However, this measure will have two consequences: First, as a
result of sterilisation there will be an increase in foreign reserves. These reserves have to
be invested properly as they are temporary and would be needed if foreign capital moves
out of the economy. Most central banks invest reserves in safe and highly liquid assets,
which do not pay high interest. Additionally, there is an opportunity cost of not using the
reserves for productive investment. Second, as central banks buy foreign currency with
local currency, money supply increases, which could lead to higher inflation. However,
the government and central bank can work out a solution to prevent the rise in money
supply. For example, the government can issue special bonds to soak up the excessive
money supply that increased due to intervention in the foreign exchange market.
However, sterilisation is not the perfect solution, as government bonds involve interest
cost and is borne by the taxpayers. Furthermore, complete sterilisation is impossible due
to practical difficulties. Thus, when using this measure, some amount of excess money
supply is likely to remain in the financial system.
2.
Lower interest rates: It is generally obvious that lower domestic interest rates will
reduce interest rate differential leading to lower capital inflows. However, this option is
not often available to central banks if they want to target very low inflation rate. This
justifies having a moderate rate of inflation.
3.
Financial sector prudence: This is an indirect measure to prevent asset bubbles in
financial markets. It imposes restrictions on bank loans, asking banks to maintain higher
provisions on loans to certain sectors like real estate or equity market to avoid bubbles in
that asset class. This option is often favoured by those who argue against restrictions on
capital flows. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was one of the first central banks to use
this measure before the crisis. It increased provision on loans to real estate sector. When
the crisis hit, banks had lesser exposure to real estate companies. Again, in the October
2009 monetary policy review, RBI increased provisions for loans to the commercial real
estate sector. Recently, China, Hong Kong and Singapore have taken steps to curb the
rise in the housing bubble. South Korea started an audit of lenders handling foreigncurrency derivatives from 19 October, 2010 to curb volatility caused by capital inflows
(Choong-Soo 2010). India is assessing its absorbing capacity of capital and thinks that it
can absorb up to $70 billion (Rangaranjan 2010). However, RBI is keeping a close eye on
the capital flows. As a small and highly open economy, Taiwan now recognises that
unfettered financial liberalisation and unbridled international capital flows can put
financial stability at risk. On the other hand, Taiwan's Central Bank Act (Articles 19 to 31
and 33 to 35) are related to a variety of policy instruments like setting reserve
requirements, managing foreign exchange, involvement in open market operations, etc.
The main purpose of the Taiwanese Central Bank Act is to achieve financial and
exchange rate stability, including targeted prudential regulations.
4.
Capital controls: These are the measures that aim to control both foreign capital
inflows and outflows. Capital controls also help governments raise revenues that can be
earmarked to mitigate future crises or meet certain exigencies. Imposing capital controls
is often a complex issue as some sector-specific restrictions have to be applied here like
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loans to asset class, etc. In October 2009, Brazil imposed a 2% tax on foreign investments
flowing into its equity and bond markets. A year later, Brazil raised financial operations
tax, known as IFO entry tax on capital inflows into fixed-income financial instruments
from 2% to 6% within a two week period to curb investment inflows. At the same time,
the government also hiked the tax on margin deposits for derivatives market transactions
from 0.38% to 6%. In addition to these measures, the central bank and Treasury make
regular dollar purchases in the local currency market. Indonesia, South Korea and
Thailand also introduced some form of measures to manage foreign capital inflows as
they are also sensing the risk of instability owing to massive capital inflows. On June 16,
2010 Indonesia announced a series of measures to stabilise its financial markets,
including abolishing the rule limiting banks' on-balance-sheet net open positions to a
maximum of 20% of their capital, while maintaining overall net open positions at 20% of
capital, widening the overnight inter-bank rate corridor and imposing a minimum onemonth holding period for Bank Indonesia Certificates.
5.
Outright ban: Policymakers can impose a ban on certain kinds of financial activity
for a temporary period as deemed appropriate. For example, Taiwan imposed capital
controls on November 09, 2010 through banning foreign funds from investing in time
deposits in a move that appeared to be aimed at deterring bets on currency appreciation.
This is because the Taiwanese Central Bank noticed that foreigners had parked about
T$500 billion (US$15.5 billion) in Taiwan dollar accounts by October 2010 and it wants
the money to be invested in stocks instead. Securities and Exchange board of India
(SEBI) proposed banning of participatory notes (P-notes) issuances on October 16, 2007.
6.
Mandatory reserve requirement: Investors may be asked to keep a certain part of
the inflow amount with the central bank, government and/or regulator. Chile was one of
the first emerging market economies which used this strategy. Chile’s measures took the
form of reserve requirements, a stamp tax on foreign credit and a minimum-stay
requirement for foreign direct investment. Starting in June 1991, the Chilean government
required a set portion of foreign capital inflows be put into a one-year, non-interest
paying deposit with the central bank. In May 1992, the reserve requirement on external
credits was raised to 30% from 20%. Later, the reserve requirements were extended to
time deposits in foreign currency. In October, the central bank of Chile increased the
period for which the deposit had to be maintained to one year regardless of the maturity
of the loan. At the same time, the spread charged over LIBOR (London Interbank Offer
Rate) in the option of paying the financial cost of the reserve requirement was raised
from 2.5% to 4%. In the middle of 1995, there were further pressures towards currency
appreciation. To stem it, in July 1995, the central bank extended the 30% reserve
requirement to foreign financial investments, particularly on the purchases of Chilean
stocks by foreigners through American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (which represent the
acquisitions of shares of domestic companies by foreigners). Thus, by the second half of
1995, there was in place a 30% reserve requirement on almost all forms of foreign capital
inflows (including external loans and bonds issued abroad, external credit lines used to
finance trade operations, foreign-currency deposits and portfolio investment) with the
exception of FDI, which was only subjected to a one-year stay requirement. On top of
these, certain portfolio capital inflows such as bonds and ADRs are limited by their
minimum-amount and risk-rating conditions. These instruments can only be issued if the
raised amount is at least US$25 million. Furthermore, the minimum acceptable long-term
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debt risk classification demanded the issuers risk-rating of BBB or better for nonfinancial companies, and BBB+ or better for banking institutions. In the first half of
1998, the situation regarding capital flows changed. Accordingly, in June 1998, Chilean
authorities reduced the reserve requirement for capital inflows from 30% to 10%.
7.
Tax on exit before desired period: The duration of holding an asset could be
defined when using foreign funds for purchasing such assets. An investor wishing to sell
assets and/or withdraw money before the stipulated period must attract a tax. This will
ensure that the foreign fund remains in the country for a reasonably longer period than
otherwise expected. Thailand’s cabinet in October 2010 agreed to impose a 15%
withholding tax on capital gains and interest income from foreign investment in
government debt in a bid to break the baht, which had climbed to its highest level
since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The announcement in Thailand came a week after
Brazil doubled its tax on foreign portfolio inflows into bonds and some other financial
instruments to 4% in its first round on 18 October 2010 to reduce upward pressure on
its currency. Because, by October 2010, the Thai baht had gained the most among
currencies in the region except Japan, increasing 10.5% compared to 10% gains for the
Singapore dollar and Malaysian ringgit, 6% for the Philippine peso, 4% for the
Taiwanese dollar, 2% for China's yuan and 0.4% gains of the South Korean won. Also,
the inflows to the Thai stock market sent the index soaring by 30% to almost 1,000 points
in four months.
8.
Restrictions on short-term asset purchase: The restriction can be imposed on
purchasing short maturity asset class like bonds, T-bills, derivatives, certificate of
deposits CD, and alike by using foreign funds to make sure that the investment works for
the country to help increase its absorbing capacity. Besides, short-selling in the securities
market should be regulated or banned. Taiwan in 2009 banned foreigners from investing
in its time deposits.
9.
Ceiling/capping on inflows: This is a direct measure that restricts inflow to a certain
amount. For example, India only allows foreign investment to a certain cumulative limit
in both corporate and government bonds. until August 2010, the restriction for Foreign
Institutional Investment (FII) in corporate bonds was $15 billion and in government
bonds was $5 billion. On 23 September 2010, this limit was raised to $20 billion for
corporate bonds and $10 billion for government bonds. The Indian government also
imposes restrictions on external commercial borrowings, which are reviewed from time
to time depending on the economic situation. These restrictions were applied a number of
times during the periods of increase in External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) inflows.
These restrictions were eased when capital flows dried up early in the current crisis. The
restrictions helped mitigate the impact of the crisis and timely lifting of the restrictions
helped some companies borrow from foreign sources. With the easing of the crisis,
restrictions on ECBs were again imposed from January 1, 2010. On October 26, 2010, the
Finance Minister of India indicated in a conference that he is not thinking of putting any
cap on FIIs, as he knows that if India has $45.5 billion inflow from FIIs it will act as
insurance towards the nation’s current account deficit. On June 13, 2010, South Korea
unveiled measures including setting ceilings on the foreign exchange derivatives
positions of domestic banks and foreign bank branches at 50% and 250% of their capital,
respectively to mitigate the volatility of capital flows and exchange rates.
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10.

Tobin tax: As suggested by Nobel Laureate James Tobin, this is a tax on all cross
border currency trade. The imposition of tax on financial transactions should prevent
speculation in the international financial markets. The Brazilian and Taiwanese measures,
as mentioned above, are some kind of Tobin tax. In 2004, India imposed a type of Tobin
tax the securities transaction tax (STT) on its equity market transactions. There have been
a lot of international discussions on implementation of Tobin tax. However, a universal
consensus is still lacking. Those who oppose this type of measure think that free capital
flows are beneficial for all nations. Besides, they argue that there is no international
agency to collect these taxes; so imposition of such a tax would not be cost effective. Yet,
the idea of the Tobin tax has been revisited in each financial crisis, including the current
one. The discussion on Tobin tax this time was initiated by the former British Chancellor
of the Exchequer Alistair Darling.

Conclusion
Based on individual circumstances, a nation can either consider one or a combination of policy
measure(s) from the above noted pool of policy responses. There is no universally fit solution for
tackling the problems arising from unanticipated foreign capital inflows; it varies from one
country to another, depending on its stage of development, extent and nature of capital flows.
This teaching note is designed as a teaching aid to illustrate this point.
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